In recent years, sustainability has increasingly attracted the attention of capital market participants. While event studies have established that stock prices react to news about environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance, further empirical evidence raises the question of whether market participants always rationally process ESG information included in a standalone sustainability report. In an experiment with investment professionals, this study investigates whether a disconnect between financial statements and sustainability reports leads to an anchoring effect in the assessment of ESG information. Results show that users of standalone sustainability reports fully adjust their valuations to the level of integrated (financial and sustainability) report users following information about bad ESG performance. However, none of the standalone reports users adjust their valuations following information about good ESG performance. Thus, financial statement users asymmetrically anchor on their financial value judgments when assessing ESG information provided in a standalone report.
Introduction
The issue of sustainability has been one of the most significant developments in the investment community in recent years, and corporate information on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues has become an increasingly essential information source for investment decisions of capital market participants. By the end of 2011, $30 trillion in assets under management by over 900 asset management firms and institutional investors backed the Principles for Responsible Investment of the United Nations (UN PRI). Similar numbers support the work of the Carbon Disclosure Project.
Broad empirical evidence supports the notion that ESG factors are relevant to companies' economic performance and, thus, are relevant to investment analysis (Margolis et al., 2007; Orlitzky et al., 2003) . Cases of companies' corruption and environmental disasters such as BP's Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico have direct and costly economic consequences for both the company and its shareholders.
For a number of years, the investment community has had extensive discussions of the quality of sustainability reporting, which constitutes a primary reason for the community's skepticism toward integrating ESG into investment decision-making processes (Juravle and Lewis, 2008; Sullivan, 2011) . Recently, however, the content quality of corporate sustainability reports has improved significantly (Foretica, 2011) . This change is the result of greater awareness of corporate governance issues, which in turn leads to greater transparency (Kolk, 2008) , and of a growing number of mandatory sustainability frameworks around the world (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2011) . Moreover, a number of sustainability initiatives have found wide-spread adoption on a global scale.
1 Nevertheless, the question of the reporting format for sustainability reports has increasingly arisen in research and practice (Eccles & Krzus, 2010; Eccles & Serafeim, 2011) .
This study investigates how the issuance of ESG information in a standalone report, separate from a report of the financial data, or in an integrated report, together with financial data, affects the valuations of professional financial statement users. While extensive research exists on the interrelationship of ESG disclosure and performance (e.g., Margolis et al., 2007; Orlitzky et al., 2003) , few studies so far address the question of how financial statement users process ESG information and integrate them into their judgments. One exception is the study of Dhaliwal et al.
(2011a) that investigates analysts' forecast errors when companies do or do not publish sustainability reports. Based on sustainability reports published separately from financial reports (so called standalone sustainability reports) they find that earnings forecasts are more accurate when sustainability reports are disclosed.
Currently most companies issue standalone sustainability reports, separated from and typically published later in the year than financial reports, which fall under regulatory and legislative directives. Thus, a spatial and temporal disconnection often occurs between the availability of ESG information on the one hand and that of financial information on the other hand, with the result that financial statement users are likely to assess the two kinds of information separately. An alternative to issuing standalone sustainability reports is to bring together financial and ESG information into an integrated report. Recently, the rising discussion about integrated reporting has shifted the focus of reporting to a more holistic representation of the company's performance in terms of both financial and ESG performance (Eccles & Krzus, 2010) . 2 From an information economics perspective, the question of whether the financial and ESG data are published in standalone reports or in an integrated report is irrelevant as long as the 2 While integrated reporting refers to a variety of issues regarding the integrated representation of a company's performance, this study focuses on the integrated presentation format of financial and ESG data.
information content is identical. However, experimental studies regularly provide evidence that, owing to limited capabilities of information acquisition and processing, different disclosure formats can substantially affect judgments and investment decisions of financial statement users (e.g., Hirst and Hopkins, 1998; Hopkins et al., 2000; Maines et al., 1997) .
Prior research has shown that analysts anchor on their prior judgments when making new forecasts and therefore underreact to new information (Amir and Ganzach, 1998) . A particular concern about standalone sustainability reports is that financial statement users may be biased in their assessment of ESG information when they have already formed a judgment based on financial data. Specifically, the temporal and spatial disconnect between the two reports may lead financial statement users to anchor on their financial value judgments, and, therefore, underreact to ESG information. In contrast, an integrated report may serve as a debiasing instrument with regard to these anchoring effects, since an integrated report leads to the simultaneous assessment of both types of information.
An experiment with 65 investment professionals, none of whom had a specialization or functional focus on sustainability, tested the hypotheses. Subjects assessed either a case with good financial and bad ESG performance or a case with bad financial and good ESG performance and evaluated the company's overall performance. Participants either received information simultaneously in an integrated report, or received ESG information in a standalone report only after receiving the financial information. The experimental results indicate an asymmetric anchoring effect in the company valuations. Specifically, in the case with good financial and bad ESG performance, we find that participants who assess information separately include ESG data in their overall valuations and make value judgments virtually identical to those of participants who assess an integrated report. In contrast, in the case with bad financial and good ESG performance, subjects strongly anchor on their financial value judgments and none of the subjects adjusts that judgment after receiving ESG information. Consequently, despite identical information content, participants assessing ESG information in a standalone report arrive at lower valuations than participants who assess the information in an integrated report.
This paper makes three primary contributions to the literature. First, it expands the literature on sustainability reports. While previous investigators have shown that sustainability reports can help investors to infer information useful for valuing firms (Dhaliwal et al., 2011a),
we provide evidence that an anchoring bias may influence the assessment of ESG information that is provided in a standalone sustainability report. This finding implies that an integrated report may help to avoid distorted valuations. The result is especially relevant as the participants in our study were highly experienced valuation and investment experts.
Second, the paper contributes to the literature on stock market reactions to ESG information. Prior studies show that announcement effects of ESG information are asymmetric in that capital market reactions to positive news are smaller than reactions to good news (Karpoff et al., 2005; Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996) . While this asymmetry may be due to the different content of good and bad ESG information (Krüger, 2009), our findings suggest that it may be fostered by asymmetric anchoring on financial valuations. A potential disregard of good ESG information may arise from the presentation format and not from the information's irrelevance for investment valuation.
Finally, the paper contributes to the literature on analyst forecasting. This investigation is, to our best knowledge, the first paper to provide controlled empirical evidence that mainstream investment professionals who are not specialized in sustainability take ESG data into account when valuing companies, albeit in different ways and depending on the nature of the information provision.
Background
Over the last 20 years, sustainability reporting has become an increasingly important topic for capital markets. In the capital markets business, the term ESG captures sustainability factors that are based on companies' sustainability reports. 3 Sustainability reporting is rooted in two main ideas. First, nonfinancial information about, for example, a company's intellectual capital and other intangible assets, its strategies to cope with environmental or climate risks, or its compliance with laws is valuable to investors, as these nonfinancial items may be leading indicators of a company's future financial performance (Eccles and Serafeim, 2011) . Second, corporations are accountable to the public for their actions and therefore have to report about their corporate social responsibility (Carroll, 1979) .
Most of the sustainability reports are aligned to the Global Reporting Initiative's (GRI) Sustainability Reporting Guidelines G3. GRI is one of the leading global standard setters for company sustainability reporting. Its G3 reporting framework, which is based on a multistakeholder approach, is a voluntary framework that contains a multitude of reporting items, although to achieve a specific application level companies must report a specific set of items.
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Financial reports and sustainability reports have traditionally been issued separately, with little connection to each other. However, at the core of the rising discussion about integrated reporting has been a call for a more holistic representation of the company's performance in terms of both financial and ESG performance (Eccles and Krzus 2010) . In 2010, GRI and the Prince's Accounting for Sustainability Project together founded the International Integrated
Reporting Committee (IIRC), which comprises a host of globally leading organizations in the 3 Several terms are used for sustainability reports, such as CSR Report and CR Report. We use the term sustainability report as a generic term for the sustainability information companies provide, while the term ESG information denominates items and data from sustainability reports that are used for investment decision-making. 4 For a more detailed description of GRI, see Clarkson et al. (2008) , Cooper and Owen (2007) and Eccles and Serafeim (2011) . For a critical analysis of GRI, see MacLean and Behnam (2010) .
area of company reporting standard setting and accounting. The IIRC's goal is to create a globally accepted framework for accounting for sustainability that brings together financial and ESG information "in a clear, concise, consistent, connected and comparable format" (IIRC, 2011, p. 2) . However, so far no empirical evidence exists showing how the integration of sustainability reports and financial statements affects decisions of professional financial statement users.
Prior research on sustainability reporting has focused sharply on the interrelationship of sustainability disclosure and financial performance. Specifically, considerable debate has taken place about the connection between ESG information and current and/or future cash flows (e.g., Dowell et al., 2000; Guenster et al., 2009; Huselid, 1995) . Recent research provides evidence that companies can benefit from publishing sustainability reports, because their costs of capital decrease if they are also able to deliver a better ESG performance (Dhaliwal et al., 2011b) .
Moreover, concerns about ESG performance can lead to higher costs of bank loans (Goss & Robert, 2011) . In addition, several meta-analyses covering more than 250 empirical studies have examined the relationship between sustainability disclosure and financial performance (Margolis et al., 2007; Orlitzky et al., 2003) and have found that the reaction of financial markets to sustainability reports is generally positive, although less so over the last decade. Similarly, event studies demonstrate that stock price changes occur as a reaction to news about environmental performance (Karpoff et al., 2005; Shane and Spicer, 1983) . These findings indicate that ESG information has become increasingly important as an information source for investors and may indeed be a relevant indicator of a company's future cash flows (Eccles et al., 2011) .
However, little research so far has explored how analysts and other professional financial statement users react to sustainability reports and assess the information included in these reports.
Prior contributions have found that good ESG performance leads to more favorable investment recommendations from financial analysts (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2010) , and that sustainability reports increase the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts (Dhaliwal et al., 2011a) , especially in countries with a stronger stakeholder orientation. However, as prior research has also shown that professional financial statement users are prone to cognitive biases when making prediction (e.g., Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992; Libby and Tan, 1999) , whether ESG information included in sustainability reports is always assessed in a rational way remains an open question.
In fact, some evidence suggests that capital market participants do not treat ESG information fully rationally. First, so-called socially responsible stocks can earn anomalously high returns (Derwall et al., 2005 (Derwall et al., , 2011 Kempf and Osthoff, 2007; Statman and Glushkov, 2009 evaluations of ESG projects (Alewine and Stone, 2011a, 2011b 
Hypotheses development
From an information economics perspective, identical information content should lead to identical valuations independent of the way the information is displayed. Thus, a company's valuation should be unaffected by whether value-relevant information is provided in an integrated report or in standalone reports. However, research in cognitive psychology regularly provides evidence that information processing and judgments can be strongly affected by information organization and presentation (Kahneman et al., 1982; Slovic, 1972 ).
An important cognitive limitation is the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) . When experiment participants are given an irrelevant number before making a judgment and are asked whether the answer to a question is greater or less than that value, judgments are systematically biased toward this value. Anchoring effects have been demonstrated in numerous contexts, including the assessment of financial statements (e.g., Kennedy et al., 1998; Northcraft and Neale, 1987) .
Anchors can be either externally provided or self-generated (Epley and Gilovich, 2001 ).
Traditionally, anchoring effects have been interpreted as insufficient adjustments from the anchor toward the "true" value. However, recent evidence shows that a bias toward an externally provided anchor is instead due to an increased accessibility of anchor-consistent information (Mussweiler and Strack, 1999, 2000) . Specifically, as individuals tend to confirm hypotheses rather than reject them (Crocker, 1982; Snyder and Swan, 1978) , their search for information is biased toward information consistent with the externally provided anchor. Nevertheless, many anchors for individual judgments are not externally provided but are self-generated. That is, when making a complex judgment, individuals may not know the exact answer to the question but may have relevant information in mind and adjust from it until they reach a plausible judgment. Thus, this information represents a self-generated anchor, since individuals are aware that they have to adjust their judgment departing from this information (Epley, 2004; Epley and Gilovich, 2005) .
The distinction between externally provided and self-generated anchors is important, because research has found that self-generated anchors trigger psychological processes different from those activated by externally provided anchors. Specifically, while the adjustment process from self-generated anchors seems to be affected by the amount of effortful thinking devoted to the judgment task, this is not the case for externally provided anchors (Epley and Gilovich, 2001; Mussweiler and Strack, 1999) . For example, forewarning subjects of an anchoring bias should activate effortful thinking, and evidence shows that forewarning reduces anchoring effects for self-generated anchors but not for externally provided anchors (Epley and Gilovich, 2005) .
In the context of sustainability reporting, the judgment of a company's financial performance may represent a self-generated anchor when financial statement users assess ESG information provided in a standalone sustainability report. As individuals tend to be strongly committed to prior decisions or judgments (Staw, 1981) , they may adjust their judgment insufficiently after assessing ESG information included in a standalone sustainability report after they have already valued the company solely on the basis of financial data. Thus, the final value judgment might be systematically biased toward the initial judgment, which is based solely on financial data. This conjecture is consistent with prior findings on analyst behavior, particularly evidence that self-generated prior forecasts represent strong anchors for further forecasts and lead to underreactions (Amir & Ganzach, 1998) . Anchoring and adjustment become especially likely when anchors are potent, as in the case of a previous prediction (Czaczkes and Ganzach, 1996) .
However, this effect may be overcome by integrating ESG data into financial statements so that financial statement users assess financial and ESG data at the same time.
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The effects of ESG information on firm valuation and the problem of insufficient adjustment for ESG information included in a standalone sustainability report are likely to be particularly relevant in two cases: when good financial performance is accompanied by bad ESG performance (GFBE case) and when bad financial is accompanied by good ESG performance (BFGE case). In both cases, insufficient adjustments may lead to an exceptionally large gap.
Thus, we suggest that in the GFBE case, users of standalone reports departing from a high financial value judgment and adjusting it for bad ESG performance are likely to end up at a higher value than financial statement users assessing both data simultaneously in an integrated report. Vice versa, in the BFGE case, users of standalone reports departing from a low financial value judgment will be likely to adjust their value to a smaller degree, and therefore end up with a lower final value, than users of an integrated report. Figure 1 displays these relationships.
---Insert Figure 1 about here ---However, one caveat applies to this prediction. As we explained above, the amount of effortful thinking devoted to the ESG information may affect the adjustment from self-generated anchors. However, this amount may be not identical in the GFBE and the BFGE cases and may, therefore, lead to asymmetric adjustments. In particular, if individuals exhibit loss aversion, as predicted by prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) , the effortful thinking devoted to ESG information may be especially high if bad ESG performance accompanies good financial performance. This conjecture is consistent with the particular relevance of bad economic news for market participants (Benartzi and Thaler, 1985; Soroka, 2006) .
Nevertheless, predicting the extent of the reduction of the gap between the valuations based on the integrated report or the standalone reports is impossible, as is predicting whether more effortful thinking might fully offset the effect of the self-generated anchor. Therefore, we predict an anchoring effect for both cases. That is, we expect a disordinal interaction with regard to the financial statement users' final value of the following form:
H1a: In the case of good financial performance and bad ESG performance, the value judgments of financial statement users using an integrated report will be lower than the value judgments of financial statement users using standalone reports.
H1b:
In the case of bad financial performance and good ESG performance, the value judgments of financial statement users using an integrated report will be higher than the value judgments of financial statement users using standalone reports.
Methodology

Overview of the experiment
Participants in the experiment read a case asking them to evaluate a company. The case was about an international manufacturer of electrical tools and appliances. The case materials focused on the company's financial and ESG performance. As part of the manipulation, subjects read either a case with good financial and bad ESG performance (GFBE case) or a case with bad financial and good ESG performance (BFGE case).
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By way of providing background, the case material first described the company's relevant markets and its competitive position. Additional information included a description of the company's two main segments, the professional segment and the do-it-yourself segment, as well as facts about its customers, distribution channels, and product lines. Participants also received information about the evolution of the company's market share during the recent economic crisis and about an ESG-relevant topic for the company.
In addition to providing the background information, the case displayed a stylized financial statement, including an income statement and a cash flow statement as well as some performance ratios commonly used for valuation purposes. Finally, case material included a stylized sustainability report with data about the company's ESG performance.
Subjects
Participants were 65 European mainstream investment professionals, most of whom were sell-side analysts or portfolio managers. None of the participants had a specialization or functional focus on sustainability, 7 and all of them entered into the experiment voluntarily. Five participants did not finish the experiment, leaving a final sample of 60 subjects. Of these subjects, 88% had at least five years of work experience in the investment business, which indicates considerable experience in using financial statements and company valuation and implies high data validity. Mean work experience was 12.65 years. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of our final subject sample.
6 Case materials were identical except for manipulations of the financial and ESG data and corresponding adjustments in the description of the company's background. See Appendix II. 7 So-called "mainstream" investing refers to conventional investment valuation or decision-making as opposed to SRI or ethical investing. Mainstream investing accounts for approximately 90% of all global assets under management.
---Insert Table 1 about here ---
The experiment was administered online. Participants were mainly recruited through personal contacts in the national and international network of an association for investment professionals. They were identified by their professional profile description, such as sellside/buy-side, equity analyst, or fund manager, and were contacted through heads of equity research or heads of departments who received a set of anonymous web addresses which they distributed among their employees. Participants gained access to the experiment through a personal password embedded in the web link leading to the experiment. Participants could neither forward the link nor enter the experiment more than once.
Design and Procedure
The experiment employed a 2 (GFBE vs. BFGE) x 2 (integrated report vs. standalone reports) full factorial design. Both factors were manipulated between subjects. The first variable (combination of financial and ESG performance) was manipulated by exposing participants to either the GFBE or the BFGE case. The second factor was manipulated by either providing financial and ESG information together in one report and eliciting one value judgment for the company (integrated report) or providing participants first with the financial data and then with the ESG data only after they had made a first valuation (standalone reports). Note that the order of the information was kept constant, i.e., financial data were always displayed before ESG data .
In the standalone reports treatments, participants were asked to submit a value judgment about the company after reviewing the financial data. This first value judgment represents the self-generated anchor of the subjects. After they had submitted this valuation, they received ESG information in addition to the financial data, and after they had reviewed the ESG information, they were asked whether they wanted to adjust their valuation and, if so, what the new valuation would be. When reviewing the ESG data, participants also had the possibility to go back to the financial data. In contrast, in the integrated report treatments, participants were provided with financial and ESG data simultaneously and, after reviewing them, were asked to submit a single value judgment.
The cases were developed by the authors on the basis of data from two real-world companies in the consumer goods and power tools industries. Data were adjusted to meet the requirements of the experiment and to make the companies unidentifiable. As the experiment was designed to analyze whether financial statement users take ESG data more strongly into account when they are provided in an integrated report rather than in standalone reports, subjects had to perceive both financial and ESG data as value-relevant. Therefore, we constructed the cases in the following way. First, to ensure the relevance of the financial data, we included income and cash flow statements containing the most relevant cash flow positions. Further, we added selected performance ratios per unit of output to make comparisons of financial data easier across periods.
Overall, we provided 33 financial items. We did not include stock market data because they reflect market expectations that may disturb subjects' evaluations. We provided participants with three years of financial data and the annual percentage changes to enable the assessment of performance developments over time. To ensure the relevance of the financial data we selected, we discussed this information with five senior fund managers, who did not participate in the experiment, and made some slight adjustments after these discussions.
Second, and more importantly, we had to ensure the value-relevance of the ESG data.
Owing to mainstream investment professionals' relative unfamiliarity with this kind of data, this task was more challenging. Therefore, we pre-selected 63 items from the Global Reporting
Initiative's G3 Reporting Standard, compliant with application level A+. Fifteen senior mainstream investment professionals with expertise in ESG, none of whom participated in the experiment, rated the value-relevance of these items on a Likert scale from 1 ("not important at all") to 6 ("very important"). Appendix I shows the results of this assessment. For the experiment, we selected the 15 items that more than 75% of the pretest participants indicated were "important" or "very important" for valuation. Two items from the selection of >75% importance could not be reported in a quantified and yet meaningful way and we eliminated them from the experimental set-up. Therefore, in the experiment, ESG performance data consisted of 13 items (7 environmental, 2 social, and 4 governance), indicating that all three categories play a significant role for company value. As for the financial data, participants received three years of ESG data and the annual percentage changes. Additionally, to facilitate comparisons across periods, they received ESG performance ratios per unit of output or input. Providing ESG data per unit of output or input is a common practice in sustainability reports, and the same financial and ESG performance indicators were used in all four treatments. Finally, we checked the realism of the prepared cases with the five senior fund managers who had provided feedback on the financial data.
The cases were constructed to reflect good and bad financial and ESG performances but cannot be interpreted as symmetrical with regard to an industry benchmark, as symmetry would require that participants be aware of the performance indicators' deviations from the industry benchmark. However, participants were not shown deviations from an industry benchmark because in reality such benchmarks hardly ever exist for ESG data. Although GRI indicators are generally accepted, the G3 framework does not specifically prescribe the format of items reported, such as whether data points are narrative, quantified, or monetized. Thus, in reality, subjects are unlikely to be aware of industry ESG performance and therefore would not be aware of the company's deviations from the industry average. Moreover, the provision of industry benchmarks in financial statements is also uncommon for financial performance indicators.
Dependent measures
As in prior studies, subjects were asked to evaluate the company (e.g., Hopkins et al., 2000; Maines and McDaniel, 2000) . We did not provide stock data because stock prices are strongly affected by the number of stocks issued and future market expectations, which would dilute the results. Therefore, we did not ask for stock price estimation but rather elicited a value judgment on a scale ranging from 0 ("absolutely not investable") to 100 ("top investment"). To control for the connection between our dependent variable and the categories our subjects are usually exposed to in their real-life decisions, we also asked for a fair and appropriate investment recommendation of the company (from "strong buy" to "strong sell"). 8 Despite the small number of recommendation categories (five), the Pearson correlation between the value judgment and the recommendation is very high (r = .75, p < .001). We conclude that our dependent variable closely reflects the recommendations our subjects would give in similar real-world settings.
In the following, INITVALUE is the subjects' first value judgment in the standalone reports treatments, and FINALVALUE is the final value judgment after having received all information. For the subjects in the integrated report treatments, INITVALUE = FINALVALUE.
To control for the effects of individual characteristics, we asked participants to indicate, on the post-experiment questionnaire, their agreement with the following statements on a Likert scale from 1 ("fully disagree") to 7 ("fully agree"):
VALUECREAT: Corporate sustainability is an important concept for long-term value creation.
VALUATION: ESG data (environmental, social, and governance data) make important contributions to thorough company valuation.
Further, we measured the perceived difficulty of valuation with and without ESG data and the perceived realism on the same Likert scale. Finally, we measured the time subjects spent to complete the whole experiment. consistent with the manipulations, the main effect of financial performance and the interaction effect are significant. These results also imply that investment professionals judge ESG data to be value-relevant and include them in their company valuations when they are provided in an integrated report.
Results
Manipulation checks
---Insert Table 2 about here ---Analysis of the control variables shows a mean score for the perceived case realism of 5.28, which is highly satisfactory. Kruskal-Wallis tests reveal no difference across experimental conditions in terms of time spent on the case, perceived realism, perceived difficulty of the valuation task with and without ESG data, perceived importance of ESG data for value creation and valuation (VALUECREAT and VALUATION), and subjects' investment experience (all pvalues > .10).
As we randomly assigned subjects to treatments, the distribution of occupations across treatments should not differ. Therefore, we classify subjects into four categories (sell-side analyst, portfolio/fund/asset manager, other type of analyst/equity strategist, other). Consistent with our random assignment, a χ2-test indicates no significant difference in the distribution of occupations across treatments (χ2 = 3.36, p > .10). Table 2 . Thus, in the case of standalone reports and bad financial performance, no subject adjusted his or her valuation after having received information on ESG performance. Figure 2 illustrates these results. Panel B of Table 3 shows that the interaction effect implied by H1a and H1b is only marginally significant (p = .098, one-tailed), 9 and t-tests show that the difference in valuations is insignificant in the treatments with good financial and bad ESG performance (60.67 vs. 57.31, t = .41, p > .10, onetailed), but significant in the treatments with bad financial and good ESG performance (34.50 vs.
Hypotheses tests
45.20, t = -1.54, p = .067, one-tailed). 10 This finding rejects H1a but supports H1b.
-----Insert Figure 2 and A potential explanation for this asymmetric anchoring effect may be loss-averse behavior of the subjects, because in the setting with standalone reports, the adjustment from self-generated anchors can be affected by the amount of effortful thinking. Loss aversion would lead to more effortful thinking about ESG performance if ESG performance is a signal about decreased future productivity and future losses rather than future gains. Thus, increased effortful thinking may have reduced the effect of the self-generated anchor in the case of bad ESG performance.
Conclusion and limitations
Conclusion
The question of how investment professionals process value-relevant information contained in sustainability reports is highly relevant, since ESG information has become increasingly important to investment decisions of capital market participants. However, prior empirical evidence and the existing reporting practice that leads to spatial and temporal disconnection between the disclosure of financial and ESG performance data raise the question of whether all types of relevant information is processed in an unbiased way. Specifically, if financial data are provided before ESG information is published, investors may anchor on their financial valuations and therefore underreact when assessing ESG information, possibly leading to biased investment decisions.
In this paper, we investigate whether providing financial and ESG information in an integrated report as opposed to the current practice of providing information separately leads to different valuations of financial statement users. While so far the literature on sustainability reporting has focused mainly on the performance effects of ESG disclosure, studies have largely neglected to analyze, under controlled experimental conditions, the way financial statement users process ESG information.
In an experiment using investment professionals as participants, we find that cognitive biases may indeed affect the processing of ESG information. Specifically, we provide evidence for an asymmetric anchoring effect in the assessment of ESG information when financial and sustainability reports are published separately from each other. In the case of good financial and bad ESG performance, subjects include additional ESG information in their valuations and adjust their value judgments to virtually the same level as subjects who assess information in an integrated report. In contrast, in the case of bad financial and good ESG performance, no subject adjusts the value judgment based on financial data, which leads to significantly lower valuations than in the integrated report case even though the information content is identical. These results indicate biased valuations in the case of good ESG performance if ESG information is provided in a standalone sustainability report.
Discussion and limitations
The asymmetric anchoring pattern found in the experiment may occur because financial value judgments represent a self-generated anchor. Effects of self-generated anchors can be reduced by effortful thinking (Epley and Gilovich, 2005) . Thus, if subjects are loss-averse, the particular relevance of bad ESG performance as a signal for bad future performance may have led them to think more intensively about the performance consequences of ESG data than in the case with bad financial and good ESG performance. This conclusion is consistent with the asymmetric reactions to good and bad economic news (Benartzi and Thaler, 1985; Soroka, 2006 While our findings indicate that simultaneous provision of financial and ESG data in an integrated report may help avoid anchoring effects in investment valuation, a potential concern is that integrated reporting could lead to information overload (Libby and Lewis, 1982; Schick et al., 1990; Tuttle and Burton, 1999) . Nevertheless, whether financial and ESG information are provided in an integrated report or in standalone statements does not affect the overall amount of information published by a firm but only the point in time when different pieces of information are published. Thus, unless standalone sustainability reports are issued in times when investment professionals' work load is particularly low, integrated reporting should not affect information overload very strongly. In the experiment, we find no evidence that participants were affected by information overload when financial and ESG data were provided simultaneously. Particularly, the time participants spent on the case did not differ significantly between the different treatments. Moreover, information overload would have been expected to make subjects disregard the relatively uncommon ESG data (Eppler and Mengis, 2004; Sparrow, 1999) .
Apparently, this was not the case.
Like all experiments, our study is subject to a number of limitations. First, we restricted the financial and ESG information to a subset of information that is usually contained in financial statements and sustainability reports so that participants could complete the task in a reasonable amount of time. This restriction may limit the generalizability if, in more complex environments, investors resort to information categories they are more used to, such as financial data. Future research could examine how more complex environments affect the use of ESG information.
Second, the experimental instrument included only quantified ESG indicators and did not include narrative content that is common in company sustainability reports. Future research might explore whether individuals process quantitative and narrative ESG information differently (Epstein, 2008).
Finally, participants did not decide about real investments but made hypothetical valuations. However, high realism scores on the post-experiment questionnaire and the close proximity of the value judgments and the categories of investment recommendations our professional subjects are usually exposed to provide some evidence against the conjecture that recommendations would differ strongly for comparable investments in reality. Note: *, **, *** denote significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively. Significance levels are two-tailed. In the treatments with standalone reports, INITVALUE is the initial value judgment made by the participants including only financial information. In the treatments with integrated reports, INITVALUE is the value judgment made by the participants including both financial and ESG information. Note: *, **, *** denote significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively. Significance levels are two-tailed. FINALVALUE is the final value judgment made by the participants including both financial and ESG information.
Figure 1 Predictions of Valuations
Figure 2 Valuations in the Experiment
Note: In the treatments with standalone reports, INITVALUE is the initial value judgment made by the participants including only financial information. FINALVALUE is the final value judgment made by the participants including both financial and ESG information. 
APPENDIX I Results of the Pre-test Assessment of Value Relevance of GRI Indicators
APPENDIX II Instructions
Performance Valuation Research Project Directions 1. This activity is anonymous -your identity is not of importance or relevance to the project. This activity is voluntary -you can leave the survey at any time and choose not to answer any question. 2. Participation will take you approx. 20 minutes. Please go through the valuation exercise in one go -do not interrupt the exercise. If in any case you have to stop please try to resume the activity as quickly as possible. 3. You can go through the materials in the order presented but from most screens you can go back and forth to any other one. 4. You may want to use a pocket calculator and/or a sheet of paper/pen for conducting the exercise. 5. Do not discuss the material with any other participant while completing the survey. 6. Please start now.
International Tools
Background
International Tools (IntT) is an international manufacturer of electrical tools and appliances. IntT was founded in 1973 and is based in continental Europe. IntT's product lines and its brand are well established in many of its markets. With products marketed in over 50 countries and approximately half of their revenues from outside Europe, IntT has achieved a global outreach in the last 20 years. The company grew above average in the first 10 years of its existence. However, IntT's growth rate decreased in the last ten years. The last five years have seen a growth rate close to stagnation. The company's Professional segment provides a range of mechanical and electronic tools and systems. This segment sells its products indirectly through retailers and directly through direct sales forces to key account customers in the building, manufacturing, automotive and engineering industries. The company's Do-It-Yourself segment manufactures electrical hand tools, including measuring and leveling tools. This segment sells its products to private end users and consumers through retailers, including home centers and hardware stores.
IntT offers a broad range of electrical tools and appliance. However, from its inception until today the company is best known for its light-weight, high-performance drill hammers. IntT 's segment Drill Hammers <2.5kg accounts for 55-60% of its total production output and almost 70% of its revenues. On several occasions in the past IntT examined expanding their drill hammer productline to include heavy duty tools 2.5kg+ to recoup market share. IntT engaged in R&D for the heavy duty tool productline but has so far not seen results from the efforts.
In a more severe economic climate and less consumer spending in 2008 and 2009 IntT was not able to keep its market share and experienced two years with demand for their products decreasing. Market research revealed that customers perceived IntT products as mature but less technologically state-of-art than those of IntT's competitors. As a response to increasing market pressure in the last five years IntT set up several internal projects and initiatives to increase its manufacturing productivity and efficiency by focusing on resource consumption and eco-efficiency. IntT's management perceived this as an opportunity to create positive features that would help to distinguish from competitors esp. from emerging markets. The perception was supported by customer feedback which showed that consumers expected electrical tools to consume less electricity. In addition, IntT found itself under pressure from several NGOs (nongovernmental organisations) which demanded from IntT to raise ecological and social standards for the company's production and its suppliers.
Please take at look at the following The company's Professional segment provides a range of mechanical and electronic tools and systems. This segment sells its products indirectly through retailers and directly through direct sales forces to key account customers in the building, manufacturing, automotive and engineering industries. The company's Do-It-Yourself segment manufactures electrical hand tools, including measuring and leveling tools. This segment sells its products to private end users and consumers through retailers, including home centers and hardware stores.
TCI offers a broad range of electrical tools and appliance. However, from its inception until today the company is best known for its light-weight, high-performance drill hammers. TCI's segment Drill Hammers <2.5kg accounts for 55-60% of its total production output and almost 70% of its revenues. On several occasions in the past TCI examined expanding their drill hammer productline to include heavy duty tools 2.5kg+ but discarded the idea as the market segment for heavy duty equipment is essentially plant hire business which would require TCI to offer finance and lease services to their customers. This was felt too risky as it might dilute TCI's profitability and also have implications on capital commitment.
Despite a more severe economic climate and less consumer spendings in 2008 and 2009 TCI enjoyed two years with demand for their products increasing. As an effect of the increase of demand TCI enhanced manufacturing capacities through opening additional assembly sites in Pakistan and Korea.
Please take at look at the following Please take a look at the ESG (environmental, social, governance issues) report of International Tool Co.
Note that you can go back to the narrative section and the financial statement section by pressing the buttons in the left top hand corner of the screen. Alternatively, you can print out the financials or the entire test case by pressing the 'print' button. 
